How will China's rise to great power status affect its foreign policy and world order? This article argues that China's future policies will depend on how it defines its identity relative to the United States and other powers, and how others respond to China's self-definition. For insights,
over the rest of the world. How will that power transition affect China's foreign policy? Some realist scholars suggest that, as its power grows, China will seek to displace the United States as the dominant power in East Asia, so driving a wedge between the United States and its Asian allies and supplanting American access to markets and raw materials. When it becomes sufficiently powerful, China might also reject important international rules, norms, and institutions that are no longer congruent with its interests. Generally speaking, rising powers such as China want to alter territorial boundaries, as well as such institutions and international rules and norms that were put in place when they were weak. 6 According to this line of thinking, China's rise to great power status will inevitably undermine US influence and standing. Competition between states is zero-sum, and an enhanced position for China will necessarily be at the expense of the United States. Contrary to realists, however, some scholars believe that a return to the historical pattern of China's dominance over East Asia would not necessarily be conflictual or destabilizing. 7 Liberals hold that China is deeply embedded in the global economy; hence that economic interdependence and the potential cost of aggression act as restraining forces on Chinese foreign policy. 8 Constructivists suggest that China's identity is influenced by interactions with others, and that China is increasingly being socialized, through its participation in international institutions, into accepting international norms.
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These scholarly analyses neglect the role of China's identity in shaping its future foreign policy, and in particular the availability of alternative identities from which China's leadership may choose. 10 Closely linked to identity choices is the question of China's relative status in the world. While it is clear that many Chinese want their country to be recognized as a great power, what does that aim imply in terms of policy choices? Will China strive to equal or surpass US military power in efforts to be recognized as an equal? Should China develop an opposing alliance system? To answer these questions, I turn to SIT, an enduring and vibrant theoretical tradition in social psychology that originated in Europe and later migrated to the United States.
Social Identity and Status
A social identity refers to that 'part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership'. 11 Social groups include nationality, ethnicity, occupation, class, and gender. Groups are social categories that help to orient the individual to the environment by classifying, segmenting, and ordering the social world. 12 By reducing complexity to a limited number of categories, social groups help people make sense of an otherwise overwhelming situation. Social groups also help to form a person's identity. Each group includes certain characteristic attributes and a set of prescriptions on how individuals should behave as members. 13 In the modern era, states and nations increasingly define people's sense of who they are. A sense of Chinese identity began to develop under the Qing dynasty in the late 19th century, partly as a result of Western and Japanese imperialistic pressure. 14 Previously, China had viewed itself largely as a historic, enduring, morally superior civilization, and not as a unified nation state. An identity is both objective (in that it describes measurable qualities) and subjective (in that it describes self-image as well as others' opinions). Because an identity is subjective, a state's view of its identity may diverge from how others see itoften an important cause of international conflict, as in the Western dispute with Russia over Ukraine, which is motivated in part by Russia's sense that its great power status has not been adequately respected by Europe and the United States.
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A social identity is both relative and comparative. The qualities of groups-such as wealth, intelligence, beauty, and achievement-have no meaning other than in comparison with those of other groups. Members evaluate their respective groups through reference to similar out-groups. Being superior on important dimensions contributes to a positive social identity and enhances well-being, whereas negative comparisons are aversive. 16 States usually have a reference state through which to evaluate their qualities and achievements. As a state's power grows, it may adopt a new, higher status reference group as a benchmark to evaluate its achievements. For example, Poland was originally compared with other former communist states in Eastern Europe, but after a decade of economic growth averaging 4% each year, it is more often grouped with the larger European Union (EU) states-Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Spain. 17 Within a community, there is a general consensus on how each group is ranked vis-á -vis other groups according to valued attributes such as wealth, power, or occupational prestige. Status refers to a group's overall place in the social hierarchy. Because the group is part of the self, people prefer to belong to high-status groups and are reluctant to be identified with low-status groups. Being a member of the latter type damages collective self-esteem. 18 The same principle applies to the international system, wherein states are consensually rated in terms of wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout. 19 Groups are motivated to adopt strategies that achieve or maintain positive comparisons with other groups. 20 According to SIT, groups strive for social identities that are positively distinctive. Therefore, group members want to be both better on relevant dimensions than other groups and different from them as well. 21 When the group is inferior to a reference group according to important characteristics, its members may be motivated to undertake one of three identity management strategies-social mobility, social competition, or social creativity. The choice of one strategy over another depends on the perceived permeability of the higher status group's boundaries, and on the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy.
If the boundaries of a higher status group are permeable, to gain acceptance into it a lower status group may adopt the norms of that group through a social mobility strategy. 22 In the same way as individuals who want to be accepted as part of the upper class emulate the values and norms of the wealthy, 23 states may also adopt the political and economic norms of the dominant states to gain entry into elite clubs or institutions. For example, since 1989, Eastern European states have adopted liberal democratic institutions and capitalism in order to be accepted as European states, rather than Balkan countries, symbolized by admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. 24 Emulation of the values and institutions of the leading powers, then, is what distinguishes a social mobility strategy. However, imitation of the behaviour of great powers-such as hosting the Olympics, deploying aircraft carriers, acquiring nuclear missiles, having a regional sphere of influence, or maintaining a space programme-all conventional status markers-does not necessarily denote a social mobility strategy. After all, the Soviet Union possessed all these status markers. It depends on the state's goal. Social mobility seeks acceptance and membership in elite clubs.
When opportunities for mobility are limited because elite clubs are not permeable to new members, and the status hierarchy is regarded as illegitimate (unfair or morally wrong) or unstable (capable of being changed), then the lower status group may resort to social competition. In this instance having an inferior status is not sufficient to mobilize the group to change its position. Minority groups sometimes accept their lower standing if they have internalized the dominant society's ideology justifying inequality.
25 Also important is stability-whether or not status relations between groups are perceived as changeable in the near future. To undertake competition against the dominant group, the lower status group must believe that it might succeed in reordering the relationship. Shifting status relations allows the lower status group to conceive of occupying a higher position.
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The social competition strategy attempts to equal or best the dominant group in its area of superiority. The goal is to reverse the relative positions of the two groups in the status hierarchy. 27 Since status in international relations is usually based on a combination of Although social competition may include actions that seem to imitate the leading state, the goal of seeking such status markers is to supplant the dominant state in the status hierarchy rather than acceptance into elite clubs. Another difference between social competition and social mobility is that the former does not require acceptance of the values and institutions of the higher status states-indeed social competition may involve promoting a rival ideology or value system, as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.
If the existing status hierarchy is viewed as legitimate (fair or justifiable) and/or stable (unlikely to change), a lower status group may exercise social creativity. Social creativity entails either re-evaluating an ostensibly negative characteristic as positive or identifying alternative dimensions of comparison on which the group ranks highly. A classic example of the first tactic would be the African-American 'Black is beautiful slogan of the 1960s'.
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Under the context of international relations, Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), argued that despite being an agricultural country and not having an industrial proletariat, China was nevertheless uniquely qualified to participate in the proletarian struggle because the Chinese people had been oppressed by imperialism, so rendering the entire country a member of the world proletariat. Economic backwardness thus became an advantage in making China more revolutionary than the advanced capitalist Western nations. 33 An illustration of the latter tactic of identifying a new dimension on which to gain status is that of an experiment where psychology majors who had scored lower in IQ tests than physics majors viewed their group as more creative.
34
In international relations, this form of social creativity would entail identifying dimensions on which to be superior other than geopolitical power, the usual status criterion. Traditionally, to gain admittance to the great power club a state would need to possess outstanding military capabilities, typically demonstrated through victory over another major 35 But states may use social creativity to gain status outside the traditional geopolitical dimension by promoting new international norms or principles of world order. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru achieved additional status for India by promoting the issues of world peace and nuclear disarmament, decolonization, racial equality, development aid for newly independent states, and restructuring the United Nations (UN). Nehru thus imbued Indian foreign policy with a moral dimension, denouncing power politics and promoting international cooperation, opposing military preparations for war in favour of negotiation, and advocating peaceful coexistence with rather than containment of communism. As a result, India had a far larger global profile than its poor, developing economy, and weak military would otherwise have warranted.
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As status requires recognition from others, for social creativity to succeed the dominant group must accept that the new dimension the aspiring group identifies is important and one on which the status-seeking group ranks highly. 37 The higher status group may be willing to recognize the other's social creativity because it highlights an alternative dimension that does not affect the basis of that superior group's high status. While status is normally measured in relative terms, because social creativity in international relations seeks status outside of the traditional realm of geopolitical power, it is possible for a state to gain higher status without diminishing the standing of the leading state. Hence state A may be recognized as superior on dimension X while State B is superior on dimension Y. 38 The availability of alternative dimensions through which to gain recognition and standing means that achieving higher status is not necessarily a zero-sum game that entails loss of position by the leading power. SIT calls into question the pessimistic view of many American and Chinese analysts wherein China's rise status will generate international conflicts due to the zero-sum nature of status. 39 For example, since the end of WWII, Germany has achieved status as a civilian power concerned with European integration and harmonizing relations without challenging the position of the United States, which derives its superpower status from maintaining sufficient military capabilities to preserve order outside its territory and region. 40 Moreover, SIT identifies the conditions under which non-competitive status seeking through social creativity is likely to occur-when the status hierarchy is legitimate and stable. Social creativity may enhance the status of a state even if the overall hierarchy remains stable because it seeks superiority on a different ranking scale. How does a social identity relate to national role? A social identity includes traits or qualities such as 'hard-working', 'efficient', and 'technologically advanced'. A role refers to actions and decisions expected of a particular position. Therefore it serves particular functions for the group or international society. 41 A social role exists prior to the states that occupy it. Expectations of the role evolve over time through accretion of experience and culture. 42 Accordingly, the occupants of particular roles, such as regional protector or alliance leader, show consistent patterns in their performance. In contrast, a social identity is supposed to differentiate a state from others. The two concepts may be reconciled by recognizing that states may select a role, such as status quo power, as a means of enacting a particular social identity, such as that of being moral and civilized.
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In sum, social mobility seeks acceptance and recognition; social competition seeks to catch up with and surpass; and social creativity avoids direct competition in favour of seeking pre-eminence in a different area. Indicators that China is following a social mobility strategy include emulation of the institutions, values, and ideology of the leading powers in order to be accepted into the great power 'club' or recognized as a member of an elite stratum. This would be manifested in domestic political and economic reforms. Indicators of social competition include the promotion of a rival ideology, arms racing, formation of a rival alliance system, driving a wedge between the rival power and its allies, military intervention to influence others' perceptions rather than for security reasons, acquiring a global naval presence, or acting as a spoiler. Social creativity would be manifested in Chinese efforts to promote new international norms, institutions, or designs for world order, or high- Because the identity management strategies are ideal types, a state's foreign policy may include elements of more than one. For example, China's current policy of seeking status through economic development includes competition in East Asia, such as the drive for Asian-dominated security institutions, and military modernization to neutralize possible US military actions against China and maintain a presence in its maritime periphery, even though China is not challenging the United States for global power parity. 44 Such behaviour is typical of a rising power and, in China's case, reinforced by the historical experience of 'one hundred years of humiliation', which taught the lesson that China must seek wealth and power (fuqiang, an abbreviation of the slogan fuguo qiangbing, 'enrich the state and strengthen its military power') to avoid external interference and loss of sovereignty. 45 Nevertheless, change in the predominant strategy will have far-reaching effects on a state's identity and world image. China may also have instrumental reasons for some actions that seem to fit an identity management strategy. Rarely does a foreign policy action serve only one goal. Foreign policy actions differ in relation to the relative weight of status as opposed to more instrumental objectives, such as economic interests, military power, or political influence. Some actions, such as hosting the Olympics, are driven almost exclusively by the desire for status. Others, meanwhile, such as promoting economic development in other countries, may also be motivated by material goals such as increased trade or access to energy resources.
This SIT framework will be applied below to illuminate developments in Chinese foreign policy since the origins of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Cold War period provides a baseline for comparison with China's foreign policy since the 'reform and opening' policy that Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978. If realism is correct, China's foreign policy aims should become more expansive and its policies more aggressive as the country's power grows. Liberal institutionalists and constructivists would predict China's internalization of existing international norms as it becomes socialized through participation in international institutions.
Since coming to power in 1949, the CCP has sought to restore China's former greatness and centrality, so overcoming a legacy of humiliation by the imperialist powers. The PRC initially pursued social competition with the West and later the Soviet Union. The 1978 'reform and opening' policies of Deng Xiaoping, with their emphasis on economic development, made it possible for China to use social creativity, especially in stressing China's independence from the superpowers. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership has tried to enhance China's international standing while maintaining a distinctive international identity separate from that of the West. 46 China's leaders' use of the social creativity strategy seems that best suited to advancing China's status by virtue of highlighting the country's distinctive identity, avoiding arousing perceptions of a 'China threat', and averting any conflict with the United States associated with the power transition.
China's Cold War Status and Identity
During the years 1949-1970 of the Cold War period, China perceived the international status hierarchy as both illegitimate and unstable, conditions that favoured its pursuit of a social competition strategy. China hence sought to restore its central place in the status hierarchy and to promote new norms and rules through communist revolution.
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After taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communists viewed the international system as exploitative and imperialistic, and destined to fall according to objective 'laws of history' as set forth in Marxism-Leninism. The CCP would establish its own concepts and norms in place of those that the imperialist powers had instituted. 48 Mao Zedong decided that the PRC would not recognize the embassy, legation, or consulate of any country that had relations with the Kuomintang government until 'New China', as Mao and the CCP called it, had negotiated diplomatic relations with those countries, a policy known as 'making a fresh start'. Moreover, China would eliminate all the special privileges that imperialist countries had enjoyed in the country before establishing diplomatic relations with them, a decision known as 'first cleaning the house before entertaining guests'.
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Having grown up in a world where China was weak and suffered humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, Mao and other CCP officials were determined to restore China's 'Middle Kingdom' status and centrality in world politics. Under Mao, China followed a social competition strategy based on continuous revolution at home and support for revolutionary movements in the Third World. 50 Despite rapprochement with the leading capitalist power, however, China ruled out the social mobility strategy, which would entail adopting the values of the United States and other Western states, which Mao regarded as attempts to justify inequality and exploitation of weak and poor states. Instead, China would obtain a central role in international politics by other means-through moral superiority and aligning with the Third World. Mao gradually developed this idea, which eventually took form in the 'Three Worlds' theory, which Deng Xiaoping presented in a 1974 speech before the UN General Assembly, according to which the developed countries in Europe and Japan (Second World) and developing countries (Third World) were increasingly resistant to attempts by the superpowers (First World) to exercise hegemony. In contrast to the United States and the Soviet Union, which tried to bully and control other states, China would never be a 'superpower'. Real power lay not with the United States and the Soviet Union; 'rather it is those people from the third world countries who unite and dare to fight and win'. 53 Mao's Three Worlds theory suggested that China could achieve improved status not by being a superpower, which would call for developing superior military capabilities, but by acting as the moral and intellectual leader of the developing Third World-the beginning of a strategy of social creativity. The 'Three Worlds' concept also implied that level of development, rather than the international class struggle, was the leading criterion through which to differentiate between states, thus providing an ideological transition towards the later 'reform and opening' policy of Deng Xiaoping. 54 Unfavourable social comparisons between the PRC and Hong Kong, Japan, and Western Europe provided the stimulus for the emphasis on economic modernization rather than class struggle, as under Mao. 55 Deng argued that China was 'very poor' and 'this is a condition far from commensurate with the standing of a great nation such as ours'. 56 Deng set three goals as China's agenda during the 1980s-anti-hegemonism, national unification, and economic development or modernization-all of which would contribute to the objective of enhancing China's status. Opposing US hegemony would restore China's international position, unification would overcome the legacy of the century of humiliation during which imperialist powers carved China up, and economic development was an important task because 'the role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth'-not the spread of communist revolution or the acquisition of military power. 57 As part of Deng's opening up policy, China offered incentives for foreign investment, allowed more trade, and encouraged students to study overseas-a departure from Mao's policy of self-reliance. China also became more active in international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, behaviour that was not associated with geopolitical competition. 58 With the reorientation of China's identity to economic production as a basis for status under Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a social creativity strategy. Deng sought to improve China's status not through the traditional zero-sum military approach or propagation of a rival ideology, but through economic development, which entailed cooperation and integration into the global economy. Whereas Mao's Great Leap Forward objective was to equal Great Britain's production of steel in three years, 59 the traditional communist 'storming' approach to development, Deng cautioned that China's economic modernization would be a 'New Long March'. 60 Deng was following a different path towards achieving great power status. In the past, as earlier mentioned, states had to possess superior military capabilities to gain admittance to the great power club. Japan, for example, despite its post-war economic growth rate and position as the world's second largest economy, was not considered a great power after 1945. 61 Deng, however, downgraded the importance of military modernization and cut defence spending to allow more investment in domestic development. 62 China's social creativity was also manifested in the 'independent foreign policy' announced in 1982 at the 12th National Congress of the CCP, when General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared that China 'never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power'. Instead of forming a united front against the Soviet Union, therefore, China would align with neither superpower. As Deng later explained, China would play neither the 'United States card' nor the 'Soviet card', but oppose hegemony regardless of source. 63 Chinese leaders believed that taking an independent line, rather than allying with another major power, maximized freedom to manoeuvre and therefore China's weight in international politics. 64 But the independent foreign policy was not just a matter of diplomatic flexibility. It implied that China was morally superior and so set apart from both superpowers. 65 China would not follow a traditional balance of power policy of tilting from one side to the other, but take decisions based on the merits of each case. A strategy of maintaining equidistance between the two superpowers could not, however, be sustained after the 1989 collapse of communist parties in Eastern Europe and the economic implosion of the Soviet Union. In 1992, a time of domestic economic crisis and international isolation, Deng said, 'we will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile and work hard for some years; we will then have more weight in international affairs'. 66 Later, Deng's thinking on foreign policy evolved into the 'twenty-four character'
principle: 'lengjing guancha, wenzhu zhenjiao, chenzhuo yingfu, juebu dangtou, taoguang yanghui, yousui zuowei' (observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, never seek leadership, hide brightness and cherish obscurity, get some things done), sometimes translated as 'keeping a low profile' (taoguang yanghui). This cautious strategy was to become the Chinese foreign policy slogan in the immediate post-Cold War era, but did not rule out China's search for status by other means.
Chinese Creativity and the Quest for Great Power Status
After the end of the Cold War, China faced the challenge of advancing its status in a world wherein it was an outsider in relation to the dominant liberal Western powers. With social mobility unattractive because the CCP was committed to 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', and social competition likely to fail, Chinese leaders showed creativity in enhancing China's status by other means as symbolized in a succession of slogans-responsible power, new security concept (NSC), harmonious world, and 'One Belt, One Road'.
China as a Responsible Power
In 1997, China eventually settled on the identity of a 'responsible power', in light of altered perceptions of the status hierarchy and the realization that social competition was premature and could provoke a regional containment policy. Initially, Chinese analysts had believed that the end of the Cold War would result in a gradual trend towards multipolarity; that US power was declining due to domestic economic problems and growing differences with its allies. The United States, therefore, would eventually be challenged by the emerging powers Russia, Japan, and China as separate poles. 67 Deng's successors jettisoned his cautious policy in Asia in favour of one more forward in defence of China's sovereignty interests in the South China Sea and Taiwan. In February 1995, the Philippine government discovered China-built platforms on Mischief Reef, an islet in the Philippines claim area. 68 Chinese analysts also concluded that American power and influence was more robust than they had realized; US allies were not balancing against the United States. In 1996-1997, therefore, Chinese analysts concluded that 'the superpower is more super, and the many great powers are less great'. 70 Indeed, the United States had upgraded its alliances with Japan and Australia. 71 In the context of China's growing power in East Asia, the PRC's actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait contributed further to perceptions of a 'China threat' among smaller states in the region. 72 Belief that the status hierarchy was stable for the immediate future and the desire to undermine the 'China threat' theory laid the basis for a shift in China's great power strategy. In 1997, Beijing adopted the identity of 'responsible major power'-a social creativity strategy. Chinese President Jiang Zemin used the term 'responsible power' (fuzeren de daguo) in a speech before the Russian State Duma in April 1997, in which he suggested that China and Russia, as major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, had an important responsibility to safeguard world peace and stability. 73 While the meaning of responsible power was not clear, it seemed to connote greater Chinese involvement and leadership in multilateral organizations. 74 Beijing had an opportunity to demonstrate its responsibility in the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, when the PRC gained prestige by refraining from devaluing its currency, thereby acting against its immediate selfinterest and providing financial assistance to struggling states such as Indonesia and Thailand. 75 Although Beijing had previously regarded multilateral organizations with suspicion, as tools of the United States, in the mid-1990s China began to take a more proactive role in Asian-related economic and security organizations, such as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) and the organization for AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 2002, China signed an ASEAN declaration on conduct for parties in the South China Sea, which renounced violent means of dealing with conflicting claims in those waters. 76 The responsible power concept implied a more proactive and less passive Chinese foreign policy than Deng's warning to 'keep a low profile'. 77 To forge an identity as a responsible great power was also a diplomatic innovation. Although great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining a stable political and economic order, it does not follow that taking on global responsibilities is sufficient to bring great power status to a state with no foundation of hard power. For example, Japan was humiliated for its 'cheque book diplomacy' of providing $13 billion in support of the Persian Gulf War but not contributing troops to the operational theatre. US ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost said in a cable to Washington, 'A large gap was revealed between Japan's desire for recognition as a great power and its willingness and ability to assume these risks and responsibilities . . . . For all its economic prowess, Japan is not in the great power league'. 78 States that contribute most to UN peacekeeping operations tend to be Middle powers, such as Canada and the Scandinavian nations. 79 ceremonies marking the 30th anniversary of ASEAN. The concept was further elaborated in December 1998 in China's first Defence White Paper. 80 The NSC added to the five principles of peaceful coexistence (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence), first articulated by China, India, and Burma in 1954, that of reliance on multilateral organizations rather than 'outmoded' Cold War military alliances. 81 China had long advocated the five principles of peaceful coexistence, but including multilateral organizations as the foundation of security was a creative means of improving its relations with neighbouring states, and contrasted favourably with the US bilateral network of alliances.
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A good example of the NSC is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which China established in 2001 (and which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) to combat terrorism, Islamic extremism, and separatism. Consistent with the NSC, the SCO was not directed against any particular state, and dealt with nontraditional security threats. The first instance of China's taking the leadership role in establishing a multilateral security organization; it was also named after a Chinese city. 83 Another description of China's foreign policy, 'peaceful rise', was coined by Zheng Bijian, former executive vice-president of the Central Committee's Central Party School and chair of the China Reform Forum. He presented it in a November 2003 speech at the Boao Forum for Asia. Peaceful rise was soon picked up by President and General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. In brief, it signified that the rise of China would not pose a threat to any other country or be achieved at the expense of any nation. However, the term 'peaceful development' replaced that of peaceful rise in Hu Jintao's April 2004 speech to the Boao Forum. The concept nevertheless continues to be used in academic publications and popular discourse. 84 An authoritative formulation appeared in Zheng's essay in the prestigious US journal, Foreign Affairs, in which he wrote, 'China has blazed a new strategic path that suits its national conditions while conforming to the tides of history'-'the development path to a peaceful rise'. In contrast to past aspiring great powers, China would not exploit other countries through invasion or colonization but attain peacefully the capital, technology, and resources it required for development by participating in economic globalization. China would 'transcend' 'traditional ways for great powers to emerge'. China would not follow the 'path of Germany leading up to WWI' or of 'Germany and Japan leading up to WWII' when those countries 'plundered resources and pursued hegemony'. Nor would China follow the path of the United States and the Soviet Union in competing for 'global domination during the Cold War'. 85 Peaceful rise could be viewed as propaganda aimed at reassuring foreign publics about China's fast economic growth rather than as a practical guide to foreign policy. 86 Peaceful rise was a manifestation of social creativity in that it proposed that China, unlike past states, could achieve great power status without military competition or territorial expansion-through peaceful economic development, largely because globalization could enable China to acquire the resources and technology it needed through trade. Some Chinese analysts raised the objection that as peaceful rise had never before occurred it was not feasible. . 88 According to Hu, a harmonious world would entail effective multilateralism based on a reformed UN; cooperative security and the establishment of a collective security mechanism; economic prosperity through mutually beneficial cooperation; and tolerance and dialogue among diverse civilizations. 89 The way to achieving a harmonious world lay in support for multilateralism, the UN, and international law. The harmonious world concept is distinctive for its combination of Western and Confucian values (the 'Great Harmony' and 'peace under heaven'). Chinese intellectuals proposed that a harmonious world could constitute the premise for a new international order based on Confucian values. 90 As Mao had attempted to eradicate Confucianism, believing that it was detrimental to China's development, this reworking of Confucian values exemplified the social creativity tactic of reframing a negative characteristic as positive. 91 Also related to traditional Chinese values is a greater emphasis on developing 'soft power'. Hu Jintao said in a 2006 speech to the CCP's influential Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, 'the enhancement of China's international status and international influence must be reflected in both hard power, including the economy, science and technology, and national defence power, and in soft power, such as culture'. Hu made advancement of China's soft power an official objective in his work report to the 17th CCP Congress in October 2007, wherein he declared that China must 'enhance the country's cultural soft power'. 92 For many Chinese academics and officials, soft power is valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally-as an indicator of elevated international status, and as a means of facilitating China's continued rise in hard power. Chinese strategists believe that a country cannot be recognized as a great power unless its values, norms, and way of life have appeal for others. 93 100 In September, China engaged in a contentious dispute with Japan over the arrest, contrary to past practice, of a Chinese fishing captain who had rammed two Japanese coastguard vessels near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are claimed by China and currently administered by Japan. Using the implicit threat of economic coercion, China induced Japan to release the captain. 101 Differences emerged within China over whether or not China had an interest in acting as a responsible power, at least insofar as the United States conceived of responsibility. Since 2005, when US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on China to be a 'responsible stakeholder', the concept of responsibility had become a matter of controversy among analysts in China. Many inferred that the US insistence on Chinese responsibility was expressly to encumber the country with overwhelming burdens that would prevent China's rise. 102 China resisted pressure from the United States to make a bigger contribution to the IMF and revalue the Yuan to alleviate the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 103 Instead, governor of the Chinese Central Bank Zhou Xiaochuan wrote an article in which he proposed bolstering IMR Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and making them serve as 'an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations'. 104 China also found that North Korean torpedoes were responsible. 106 When, in November 2010, the DPRK shelled a South Korean island, killing four, China's muted response was that both sides should avoid further escalation. 107 Some Western analysts have argued that China's actions represent no significant change from previous behaviour. 108 Contradicting the suggestion that China's behaviour was assertive, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said at a March 2010 press conference that China was merely adhering to its principles of defending its 'core interests and dignity' on issues of sovereignty, security, and development. 109 In late December 2010, State Councillor Dai
Bingguo published an essay reaffirming the country's path of peaceful development. 110 Other Chinese analysts contend that China has merely responded to the provocations of others, and that being more outspoken about its 'core interests' is entirely appropriate in view of the increase in the country's power and influence. 111 The trend towards a more pro- Instead of arms racing, expanding ties to rogue states, or forming a hostile alliance against the United States, which a social competition strategy would entail, Xi has engaged in remarkable institution building-evidence of social creativity. Instead of being a 'responsible stakeholder' in a Western-designed order, Xi, consistent with social mobility, seeks to apply certain Chinese values to international norms and institutions, such as 'justice', 'fairness', and 'righteousness'. 120 Xi's diplomatic innovativeness is best displayed by the ambi-excessive amount of concessions the United States may be expected to make to China's point of view. 136 But Xi Jinping did much to alleviate such fears by reaching an historic agreement with Obama at the APEC summit in November 2014 on curbing emissions to tackle climate change. 137 Xi exudes confidence that China's economic development will eventually bring with it the global prestige and respect that the Chinese desire, and that competing with the United States for overall military superiority would be counterproductive. 138 
Conclusions
China is still trying to forge a new identity and role consistent with its rising power. Since 1996, and perhaps even earlier through Deng Xiaoping's 'independent foreign policy', China has generally followed a social creativity strategy calculated to enhance its status, with occasional examples of assertiveness. Instances of social creativity in Chinese foreign policy include the responsible power, NSC, harmonious world, and One Road, One Belt. China has emphasized throughout its morality and distinctive path to great power status by domestic development, creative diplomacy, and proposals for world order. Historically, the path to great power status has exerted the minimum requirement of a demonstration of superior military power through victory in war, with a strong economy playing a subordinate role, as demonstrated by Japan and Germany's failure to achieve entry to the top rank of world powers after WWII despite their considerable economic extent and importance. In contrast, the responsible power concept sought to enhance China's prestige through participation in regional multilateral organizations and giving economic assistance to its Southeast Asian neighbours. The NSC emphasized multilateral cooperation and trust-building rather than deterrence and alliance formation. The harmonious world highlighted Confucian values as a possible basis for a new world order. Finally, the Silk Road project of current Chinese President Xi is an enormously ambitious scheme to improve China's international status by enhancing regional prosperity and connectedness.
China has not followed a strategy of social mobility, which would entail progressive political liberalization along the lines of Western constitutional democracy in order to be accepted into elite clubs. China has also resisted political socialization by international institutions, contrary to liberalism and constructivism. The PRC has an ambivalent attitude to global governance, evident in its rejection of liberal norms and support for Westphalian sovereignty.
intervened militarily in areas where it has substantial economic stakes, such as the Middle East. China has a manned space travel programme, but no peer competitor in any space race. 140 China's ability to acquire predominant influence in Asia is potentially checked by the other major powers Japan, India, and the United States. Globalization has eased China's task of achieving status without being the leading military power, because nuclear weapons make major power war prohibitively costly, and territorial conquest is no longer acceptable. China's social creativity policy suggests that China's rise to great power status need not be a zero-sum game with the United States, and that enhancement of the PRC's global standing does not necessarily entail attenuation of the US status. Too many analysts on both sides believe that any achievement or new capability on China's part would prejudice the US stature. Such thinking could lead to geopolitical competition and war. But China thus far has avoided that outcome by pursuing status through peaceful development and promotion of international norms, areas that do not compete with US global military superiority, responsibility for world order, or soft power.
According to SIT, it is important that other powers acknowledge and reinforce China's pursuit of great power status by means other than those employed by great powers such as Germany and Japan before WWII, and by the Soviet Union, which sought military predominance and territorial expansion. If China perceives that it is excluded from the great power club, it may resort to social competition, including acting as a 'spoiler' and forming ties with anti-Western states. The United States should encourage and reinforce China's efforts to promote multilateral cooperation in Asia, even when that entails forming institutions that the United States does not control.
SIT also predicts that China will be more likely to continue a strategy of social creativity if the Chinese perceive the international status hierarchy as both stable and legitimate. This means that the United States should not convey the impression that it is rapidly declining in power and interests, or of being unable to maintain its commitments and promises. At the same time, the United States should ensure that the Chinese believe they have an interest in the rules and norms of the international system, and that they occupy their rightful position in the status hierarchy. This may involve acceptance of certain classic Chinese values, and adapting existing international institutions and norms in recognition of Chinese power and interests. If China continues to follow a social creativity strategy of seeking status in a different domain, its continued rise to great power status need not be a zero-sum game with the United States. 
